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THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT FOR
CONSPIRACY: THE MODEL PENAL CODE
AND THE PROGRESSIVE LAW OF JUDGE
LEARNED HAND
TED PRIM*
This article will explore the judicial opinions of Judge Learned
Hand of the Second Circuit concerning the mens rea requirement
for conspiracy. It was in the development of a progressive mens rea
requirement that Judge Hand made his greatest contribution to
conspiracy law. His opinions will be discussed with regard to the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and official comments
from Tentative Draft No. 10 since many of his thoughts were incor-
porated by its drafters.' The article will also develop an analytical
framework for the mens rea requirement for conspiracy. Hopefully,
this framework will clarify an admittedly complex and seemingly
contradictory body of law. It should be emphasized that this article
does not attempt to deal with the many evidentiary problems which
plague conspiracy law.
I. BACKGROUND-CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy is defined by the Code,2 Judge Hand,3 and the cur-
rent law4 as an inchoate crime; that is, the commission of the crime
is not based on the occurrence of the substantive evil the law seeks
to prevent, but rather rests upon an agreement to commit that evil.
Therefore, conspiracy deals only with situations in which either the
agreement to commit a substantive offense has not yet reached the
level of an attempt, or the agreed upon plan has failed prior to an
attempt.
Under the Code, conspiracy merges into the substantive offense
when the defendant's actions reach the level" of an attempt.5 The
* Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School; B.A., Stanford University, 1969; J.D., Stan-
ford Law School, 1973.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comments at 107-33 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)
[hereinafter cited as Comments].
2. Id. at 96-97. The same view is taken in THE PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE FOR THE STATE
OF MISSOURI (hereinafter cited as the MissouRI PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE), § 9.020(1) (1973).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1268 (1975).
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(1)(b), Comments at 32-33 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956);
Comments, supra note 1, at 98-100.
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drafters of the Code chose not to prescribe punishment for an agree-
ment to commit a crime once the crime itself has been committed.
However, as perceived by Judge Hand6 and the current law,' con-
spiracy does not merge into the substantive offense, but remains an
independent crime regardless of whether the substantive offense is
ultimately committed.
The propriety of punishing conspiracy even after the commis-
sion of the substantive offense is not an issue in this article. Here
the only concern is with the mens rea of the parties at the time they
formed their agreement. Therefore, although most of the cited deci-
sions of Judge Hand and the current law involve the actual commis-
sion of substantive offenses, this article will examine only the in-
choate conduct completed prior to any attempt to commit the sub-
stantive offense.
In order to understand some of the more controversial aspects
of conspiracy, one must examine the social policies behind punish-
ing such inchoate behavior. Because a conspiracy involves an agree-
ment between two or more persons to commit a crime, it is viewed
as more dangerous than the acts of an individual and, thus, war-
rants earlier intervention by the legal system. There are several
reasons for this fear of group action. First, it is believed that there
is psychological reinforcement for the decision to commit the crime
and social pressure against a decision to postpone or reject its com-
mission.' Second, even if one removes himself from the conspiracy,
other conspirators may still complete the act which he helped set
in motion at an earlier date Third, it is believed that there is a
greater likelihood of accomplishing the crime due to the increased
number of participants."
To combat this danger of group action, society has permitted
its law enforcement officials to intervene any time after an agree-
ment has been formed and accompanied by an overt act." The hope
is that crime prevention will be served by allowing the implementa-
tion of isolation and rehabilitation techniques before the criminal
6. See, e.g., United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929).
7. See, eg., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1961).
8. Id. at 593-94; see also Note, Criminal Conspiracy: Bearing of Overt Acts Upon the
Nature of Crime, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1924).
9. Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 924
(1959).
10. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 276, 283-84 (1948).
11. See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.
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activity reaches the level of an attempt. 12
Since the defendant has already decided to risk punishment for
the commission of the substantive offense, punishment for conspir-
acy probably has little deterrent value. 3 For example, the law pen-
alizes murder partially for the purpose of discouraging similar anti-
social conduct. If one is planning to murder, the penalty for conspir-
acy will not have any additional deterrent effect above and beyond
the penalty imposed for committing the substantive offense. How-
ever, there are two possible exceptions to this reasoning. First, a
person may feel that his chances of being apprehended would be
small if the crime were successfully completed, but large prior to the
time of commission. Second, perhaps a penalty for conspiracy will
force a person contemplating criminal conduct to consider the con-
sequences at an earlier date.
II. ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY
Section 5.03 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
defines "conspiracy" as follows:
(1) Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with
another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose
of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or
more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com-
mit such crime.'4
A. The first point of permissible legal intervention is after the
formation of an agreement to promote or facilitate the commission
of a crime and the occurrence of an overt act which brings the
agreement to life.
Because of the fear of group conduct, conspiracy as defined by
12. Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Indi-
vidual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REV. 276, 284 (1948).
13. Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAav. L. REv. 920, 925
& n.27 (1959).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). In the Missoum PaoposED
CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020, the definition varies slightly:
(1) A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit an
offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he agrees
with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in
conduct which constitutes such offense.
1975]
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the Code,15 Judge Hand,'8 and most current law'7 only requires an
agreement to commit an act, and the performance of an overt act,
no matter how insignificant, 8 in furtherance of the agreement. In
contrast, an individual not a member of a group can be punished
only if he has taken a "substantial step" toward the commission of
a crime beyond the stage of mere preparation. 9
B. The object of a conspiratorial agreement must be the
commission of a crime.
One tendency under the common law was to construe broadly
the object of the conspiracy in order to minimize antisocial group
activity."' Consequently, members of groups were prosecuted for
conspiracy to commit acts which would not have been criminal if
performed by a single individual.' Some states follow the common
law and still view agreements to "injure the public morals" as crimi-
nal conspiracies. The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) rejected this
broad construction of the conspiratorial object, believing that con-
spiracies whose objects were defined as generally "malicious,"
"immoral," "oppressive," etc., were too vague to be made the ob-
ject of criminal prosecution. 23 The A.L.I.'s approach concurs with
Judge Hand's view that immoral conduct is not enough to constitute
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1), (5) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The MIssoum PRO-
POSED CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020(4), also requires overt acts.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944); United
States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929).
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975); § 556.130, RSMo 1974 Supp.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20 (McKinney 1975);
contra, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 104 (1959); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.22.020 (1961).
18. See Comments, supra note 1, at 141 (for the Code's position); United States v.
Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929) (for Judge Hand's position); e.g.,
§ 556.130, RSMo 1974 Supp. (previous Missouri law excepted felonies upon the person of
another in § 556.130 RSMo 1969); People v. Sullivan, 113 Cal. App. 2d 510, 248 P.2d 520
(1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 955 (1953); People v. Klinkenberg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 608, 204
P.2d 47 (1949) (for illustrations of current law's position).
19. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 557 (2d ed. 1969).
20. See, e.g., State v. Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 517, 114 S.W. 1132 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
21. See, e.g., State v. Loser, 132 Iowa 419, 422-24, 104 N.W. 337, 338 (1905); Common-
wealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 349-50, 63 S.W.2d 3, 5 (1933).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14 § 103 (1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1970); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.22.010 (1961). Missouri amended § 556.120 in 1973, deleting the object of
committing "any act injurious to the public health or public morals" as sufficient to consti-
tute a conspiracy, but retaining restrictions against specific false or malicious agreements to
indict another for any offense, procure another to be charged or arrested for any offense, or
move or maintain any suit.
23. Comments, supra note 1, at 98, 102-03. The same view is taken in the MissouRi
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020, Comment at 117.
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Since the major purpose of conspiracy law is to prevent the
commission of substantive crimes, only agreements whose objects
are criminal should be punishable. When distinguishing civil
wrongs from criminal acts, the legal system should strive for maxi-
mum predictability. Providing criminal punishment for an agree-
ment to commit a non-criminal act definitely fails this test.
C. The scope of liability for each individual actor is measured
by his own culpability.
The Code's measure of an individual actor's culpability is his
"purpose of promoting or facilitating" the commission of a crime.25
Where an individual conspirator's culpability has been established,
it is irrelevant that one or all of the persons with whom he conspired
cannot be convicted." Section 5.04 explicitly provides that where
the actor is responsible, it is no defense that he conspired with one
who was irresponsible or immune from prosecutionY Similarly, one
party's secret intention not to carry out the agreement does not
affect the other party's culpability. In terms of the Code's rationale,
conviction would not be based on the actor's promotion or facilita-
tion of a substantive offense, but rather on the concept that such a
dangerous individual should be subject to the restraints of the legal
system.8
The conventional approach under current law looks to the culp-
ability of the conspiracy as a whole in order to define the individual
culpability of each actor. Consequently, there must be either at
least two guilty conspirators or none. 29
The Code's view also differs from Judge Hand's. He maintained
that at least two conspirators must be capable of being convicted if
there is to be a successful prosecution of any one for conspiracy."
The concept of individual culpability under the Code also var-
ies from current law concerning inconsistent verdicts. The conven-
24. See United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
25. Comments, supra note 1, at 107. The MIssouRI PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE is in
accord, § 9.020, Comment at 117-20.
26. Comments, supra note 1, at 104; the MISSOURI PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020,
Comment at 117, agrees.
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04(1)(b), (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Comments, supra note
1, at 104, 171-72; accord, MissouRI PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020, Comment at 117.
28. See Comments, supra note 1, at 104-05.
29. Comments, supra note 1, at 104; United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967).
30. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929).
1975]
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tional view is that the actor's conviction cannot stand if his only
alleged co-conspirator has been acquitted." Under the Code, it is
irrelevant that a co-conspirator is acquitted, because there is little
reason to deny one's culpability because of another's innocence.2
Furthermore, the Code states that a criminal should not be allowed
to go free just because there may have been a miscarriage of justice
in the co-conspirator's trial.13 Judge Hand promulgated similar
views in United States v. Austin-Bagley,34 where he held that the
acquittal of two co-conspirators was not determinative of the culpa-
bility of the other co-conspirators.
Il. ESTABLISHING THE PURPOSE TO COMMIT A PROHIBITED ACT
Having presented a background on conspiracy, the remainder
of this article will deal with two principal issues: first, when does
mere knowledge of another's unlawful acts or plans constitute pur-
pose to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime;35 and sec-
ond, where knowledge does not exist, when can a court find an
inference of purpose to promote or facilitate the commission of a
crime? The answers to these questions are crucial because, regard-
less of the elements of the substantive crime, purposefulness is al-
ways an element of a conspiracy to commit the crime.
The Model Penal Code has largely adopted Judge Hand's view
of conspiracy as it relates to mens rea and the requirement that
there be a purpose to promote or facilitate the commission of a
crime." Purpose may be established in relation to prohibited con-
duct, such as importing illicit drugs, or in relation to prohibited
results, such as homicide." In either event, the general rule under
the Code is that the actor must have the purpose of performing the
prohibited conduct or accomplishing the prohibited result. 9
Perhaps the biggest problem in this area of conspiracy law is
that of purposefulness in relation to circumstance elements. A cir-
31. United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56, 57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942);
People v. James, 189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 16, 10 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1961).
32. Comments, supra note 1, at 106. Accord, MIssouRI PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 9.020,
Comment at 117.
33. Comments, supra note 1, at 105-06.
34. 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929).
35. See generally Comments, supra note 1, at 107-09.
36. Id. at 109.
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Comments, supra note 1,
at 107-09.
38. Comments, supra note 1, at 109.
39. Id. See also R. PERKINS, CRmiNAL LAW 629 (2d ed. 1969).
[Vol. 40
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cumstance element is a fact which exists independently of an act
but may cause the act to be classified as a crime." For example, the
age of a female is a fact which exists independently of the act of
seduction, but which will result in the classification of the act of
seduction as a crime. The problem which circumstance elements
creates is most acute in relation to strict liability offenses and will
be discussed in Section M. C., infra.
A. Purpose cannot be established where lawful conduct is
combined with mere knowledge of planned illegal action.
Assume that A, knowing of B's illegal plans, agrees to perform
a lawful act for B. Can A be convicted of having conspired with B?
The crucial question to be answered under the Code in this
situation is whether knowledge is sufficient to find purposefulness
to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime when A has acted
lawfully. Both Judge Hand 2 and the Code 3 require more than mere
knowledge for a finding of purposefulness. In contrast, Judge Parker
of the Fourth Circuit believed that a lawful act, combined with
knowledge of planned criminal activity, was sufficient to constitute
criminal conspiracy.4
In United States v. Falcone,45 the conspiracy conviction of a
merchant who sold sugar with knowledge that it was being used for
the illicit production of whiskey was reversed, Judge Hand stating:
There are indeed instances of criminal liability ... where the law
imposes punishment merely because the accused did not forbear
to do that from which the wrong was likely to follow; but in prose-
cutions for conspiracy or abetting, his attitude towards the forbid-
den undertaking must be more positive. It is not enough that he
does not forego a normally lawful activity, of the fruits of which
he knows that others will make an unlawful use; he must in some
sense promote their venture himself, make it his own, have a stake
in its outcome .... 11
Judge Hand believed that, although the defendant's conduct may
have been morally reprehensible, it nevertheless fell short of a part-
40. See generally Comments, supra note 1, at 110-13.
41. Id. at 110, 112.
42. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
43. Comments, supra note 1, at 108-09.
44. Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581, 589 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
See also Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940).
45. 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
46. Id. at 581.
1975]
7
Prim: Prim: Mens Rea Requirement for Conspiracy
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
nership in crime or a personal advancement of the criminal purpose
of the conspiracy.47
Under current law, the requirement of purpose to facilitate the
commission of a crime is unclear. Some decisions require informed
and interested cooperation, or a "stake in the venture," in addition
to knowledge,48 although others hold that knowledge may, in some
cases, be sufficient to convict for conspiracy." As the commentary
to the Code properly notes, many of the cases requiring intent or
purpose stress such facts as quantity sales, the seller's encourage-
ment, and continuity of the relationship in situations where the
vendor knowingly sells material for an illegal purpose." However, in
some cases, preventing the vendor from conducting business with
the vendee when he has knowledge of the vendee's illegal activities
may put an unrealistic burden on the vendor who is motivated to
make a normal profit." Such a person may not be dangerous enough
to require rehabilitation or isolation.52
B. Purpose may be found regarding an implied term in the
agreement.
Implied terms may be properly established as actual parts of a
conspiratorial agreement from the express terms if they are indis-
pensible to the commission of the crime." For example, if A and B
conspire to defraud the public in the sale of land, an implied term
to use the mails may be inferred if such a use was necessary in order
to carry out their scheme.
The problem posed by the use of implied terms may be illus-
trated by the following hypothetical: A and B conspire to deal in
stolen securities. B then makes arrangements to bring the stolen
securities across a state line. Can A be convicted for conspiracy to
bring stolen securities across state lines?
Judge Hand,5 current law,5" and the Code56 have established
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-13 (1943).
49. See, e.g., Quirk v. United States, 250 F.2d 909, 911 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 913 (1958); United States v. Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1952).
50. Comments, supra note 1, at 107.
51. Id.
52. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
53. See, e.g., Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351, 361 (6th Cir. 1943).
54. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
55. See, e.g., Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147, 152-53 (8th Cir. 1966); Fisher v.
United States, 324 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1963), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 873 (1964); Mansfield
v. United States, 155 F.2d 952, 955 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 792 (1946); Oliver v.
United States, 121 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1941).
56. See Comments, supra note 1, at 111. Although the Code discusses this problem in
[Vol. 40
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purpose to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime through
inference from implied terms in the agreement. In United States v.
Crimmins,5 7 Judge Hand used the theory that implied terms in in-
terstate commerce crimes could establish the circumstance element
required to create a federal offense (crossing of state boundaries).
He reasoned that knowledge that the items would travel or would
naturally have to travel through interstate commerce met the re-
quirement of purpose to have them cross state lines, thus allowing
prosecution. A finding of a lack of such knowledge, though, would
mean the purpose requirement for the implied term would be unful-
filled, since a finding of conspiratorial liability would then go be-
yond the terms of the understood agreement.
Instead of making the interstate transportation of stolen items
a circumstance element of the offense, however, the drafters of the
Code believed it should only be relevant as a basis for obtaining
federal jurisdiction," thus vitiating the need to find purpose in that
regard. The Supreme Court recently adopted the Code's view in
United States v. Feola,5 in which the Court stated that knowledge
of the victim's identity as a federal agent was not necessary for
conviction of conspiracy to assault a federal official. The Court said:
: * * we hold that where knowledge of the facts giving rise to federal
jurisdiction is not necessary for conviction of the substantive of-
fense embodying a mens rea requirement, such knowledge is
equally irrelevant to questions of responsibility for conspiracy to
commit that offense.60
Under the formulation outlined in the Code"' and Feola,62 if the
circumstance element either was an express term of the agreement
between the parties or actually occurred through commission of the
substantive offense, knowledge of the circumstance element need
not be shown. Although this eliminates the necessity of considering
jurisdictional implied terms for acts which are crimes even without
such terms (e.g., theft or assault), it should be noted that inferences
the context of circumstance elements, it appears to recognize Judge Hand's view that liability
should be imposed in this situation if the court finds that there is an "implied term in the
agreement" that securities would be brought across interstate boundaries.
57. 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
58. Comments, supra note 1, at 112.
59. 95 S. Ct. 1255 (1975).
60. Id. at 1269.
61. Comments, supra note 1, at 112.
62. 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1269 (1975).
19751
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of purpose from implied terms may still establish other elements as
parts of conspirators' plans. 3
By viewing these circumstance elements as substantive parts of
the offense and thus requiring inferences of purpose regarding such
implied terms, Judge Hand imposed a greater burden of proof on
the prosecution and afforded greater protection to the defendant.
Such a view, however, also increased the temptation to weaken the
purpose requirement, so that the net effect of Feola may be mini-
mal.64
Judge Hand's writings reveal some inconsistencies as to the
required specificity of an implied term sufficient to establish pur-
pose. In United States v. Tannuzzo,65 the court indicated that, even
though the defendant probably would have been willing to have the
goods sold across state lines, this did not constitute an implied term
in the agreement. Judge Hand6 did not participate in that decision,
although he did write a pre-conference memorandum on the subject
in which he disagreed with the majority opinion's factual conclu-
sion:
There was enough to hold Vespole in the testimony of Dusatnick
that in Vespole's presence he was told by Mike that they were
moving the stuff from one drop to another but that all would come
right. This is within our decision in United States v. Crimmins.
Vespole knew that they were moving it where they could and be-
came party to where they chose to move it. 7
In this situation, Hand equated a willingness to have the goods
moved with an implied term to have the goods moved. This appar-
ently is a divergence from his own purposefulness standard which
he usually so staunchly defended. However, this memorandum by
Judge Hand might be better analyzed under the reasoning in Sec-
tion IV of this article, relating to liability for acts of co-conspirators
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1266. Justice Blackman noted that Hand's analysis in Crimmins had been
rejected by some circuits, and that most avoided it by finding the required knowledge through
inference from the scope of the conspiratorial agreement. He also criticized Hand by saying
that the Crimmins doctrine could not have been applied in that case, since the substantive
offense proscribed clearly wrongful conduct which could not have been engaged in without
an intent to accomplish the forbidden result, and thus the requisite intent was present. Id.
at 1267.
65. 174 F.2d 177, 179-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949).
66. Augustus Hand, however, wrote the opinion.
67. L. Hand, Pre-Conference Memorandum: United States v. Tannuzzo, at 2 (1949).
(Hand Papers on file at Harvard Law School. I gratefully acknowledge permission from the
executor of the Hand estate to examine and quote from this memorandum.)
[Vol. 40
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/2
MENS REA
within the common purpose of the conspiracy. In any event, Judge
Hand drew the line clearly in United States v. Penn8 when he said,
"Imen do not conspire to do that which they entertain only as a
possibility . . . .
The social purposes of conspiracy law are met when an implied
term establishing purpose is found to exist. When defendants enter
into a conspiracy via a plan, some of whose terms are implicit, the
danger of concerted action and the psychological reinforcement of
group activity are as great as in cases in which the terms of the
conspiracy are explicit.
C. Conspiratorial purpose to commit strict liability crimes can
exist despite defendant's ignorance of circumstance elements.
In the above section, circumstance elements were not necessary
to establish the commission of a crime, but were mainly important
in determining jurisdiction. In a strict liability crime, however,
there is no criminal act without the presence of the circumstance
element in question. The problem in this section can best be illus-
trated by the following hypothetical: A and B conspire to seduce C
without the use of force or threats. Unknown to A and B, C is only
sixteen years old. Can A and B be convicted for conspiracy to com-
mit statutory rape?
This area of conspiracy law is one of the most complex and
controversial. Liability for conspiracy still hinges on a showing that
the actor had the purpose to promote or facilitate the commission
of a crime, even though the substantive crime itself has no mens rea
requirement."0 The rationale for imposing liability in this situation
is that if the object of the agreement (to seduce C) is carried out,
then the conduct which constitutes the substantive crime (the se-
duction of a girl under the age of 18) will necessarily be accom-
plished. Therefore, since the agreement necessarily embodies the
prohibited conduct, the purpose to promote or facilitate the com-
mission of a crime may be inferred despite the actor's ignorance of
circumstance elements. Those advocating liability in such cases also
reason that where knowledge is not required for conviction of the
substantive offense, it need not be present for conviction of conspir-
acy either, if the object of the conspiracy necessarily includes the
68. 131 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1942).
69. Id. at 1022.
70. Comments, supra note 1, at 110, 112-13.
1975]
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prohibited conduct.7 In other words, the purpose to commit an act,
regardless of any intention to act criminally, is all that is required. 72
However, if the object of the conspiracy only includes a
possibility of prohibited conduct, the conspiratorial requirement of
a purpose to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime is not
met.73 For example, if A and B conspire to seduce the first girl they
talk to, the requisite purpose would be lacking. Because there is no
guarantee that the first girl they talk to will be under age 18, the
government should not intervene at the time of the agreement.
The Code gives a qualified vote of support for the above analy-
sis, but leaves the issue open for further judicial development:
Under Section 5.03(1) (a) it is enough that the object of the agree-
ment is "conduct which constitutes the crime," thus importing the
mental state required by the substantive offense, except as to re-
sult elements, where purpose clearly is required . . . . Although
the agreement must be made "with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating" the commission of the crime, we think it strongly
arguable that such a purpose may be proved although the actor did
not know of the existence of a circumstance which does exist in
fact, when knowledge of the circumstance is not required for the
substantive offense. Rather than press the matter further in the
Draft, we think it wise to leave the issue to interpretation .... 71
Judge Hand adopted a similar position in support of conspiracy
convictions in strict liability crimes in United States v. Mack.7
There, the object of the agreement was that no disclosure be made
to anyone concerning the activities of a prostitute. Judge Hand
found that carrying out the object of this agreement would necessar-
ily constitute the prohibited conduct of failing to register her as an
alien within thirty days and, therefore, the finding of intent was
proper even though the actor had not been previously aware of her
alienage or the registration requirement.
A contrary view seems to be presented in United States v.
Crimmins.76 Although Judge Hand based his decision on the ab-
sence of an implied term, the case is famous for his "red light"
71. Id.; cf. United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1940); Wilkerson v.
United States, 41 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 1930).
72. In United States v. Feola, the Court explicitly stated that it was saving this question
for another day. 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1267 (1975).
73. Cf. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
74. Comments, supra note 1, at 113.
75. 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940).
76. 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
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example . 7 Judge Hand reasoned that one could not conspire to run
a red light which he did not know existed. The most one could do
would be to conspire to drive recklessly, an act which .would not
necessarily constitute the substantive crime of running a red light.
His reasoning, although basically sound, might be carried a step
further. If one conspires to drive recklessly, there is only a possibility
that he will run a red light. Similarly, if A and B, being unfamiliar
with a town, agree to drag race from point X to point Z on a map,
they will not have formed a conspiracy to run the red light at point
Y midway between. Because the light may be green when they race
past point Y, there is only a possibility that the object of the con-
spiracy and the prohibited action will be identical. However, if A
and B agree, while sitting under a stoplight of which they are
unaware, to begin the race as soon as the blue Ford passes, a police
officer overhearing their conversation and knowing the light will still
be red when the Ford passes could arrest them for conspiracy to run
the red light. Here the concept of strict liability becomes relevant;
the object of the agreement would necessarily constitute the prohib-
ited conduct.
Although it appears that the Code views Crimmins and Mack
as contradictory cases, 7 the "red-light" example in Crimmins is not
a rejection of the reasoning in Mack. In Crimmins, A conspired with
B to deal in stolen securities. The court found that there was not
an implied term to deal in interstate securities and that A had no
knowledge of B's activities with interstate securities. A close exami-
nation of the facts in Crimmins reveals that the prerequisites for a
Mack-type (strict liability) analysis are missing. An agreement to
deal in stolen securities does not necessarily include an agreement
to bring stolen securities across state lines. It is conceivable that A
intended to deal only in intrastate securities.79 Therefore, even
though strict liability as to the interstate element would exist in the
completed crime, the agreement entertained only a possibility of
dealing in interstate securities. In Mack, the agreement to keep the
activities of the prostitute secret necessarily involved the prohibited
conduct of failing to register her as an alien.
In strict liability cases the rationale for punishing conspiracy
relates to the danger involved in waiting until an attempt actually
77. For a discussion of Hand's "red-light" example in a different context, see United
States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1266-67 (1975).
78. See Comments, supra note 1, at 113 & n.64.
79. See United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
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occurs. Why should law enforcement officials be forced to wait until
the sixteen-year-old is being seduced before they can act? To sus-
pend legal intervention in the hope that the conspiracy might fail
prior to an attempt, or that the conspirators might become aware
of the circumstance element and change their minds, may be too
costly to society. The object of the agreement already embodies the
conduct subject to the strict liability penalties and, therefore, it is
thought that the conspiracy should be nipped in the bud. The same
rationale concerning crime prevention exists in strict liability cases
as in the conventional conspiracy situation, except that in the for-
mer the conspirator might gain knowledge of the circumstance ele-
ment and change his mind.
Those who oppose finding purpose in strict liability offenses
where circumstance elements were unknown to the actor argue that
the conspirators, for example, might see the stoplight and terminate
the race. They argue that one cannot form the requisite purpose for
conspiracy without knowledge of the circumstances . This objection
is applicable to any conspiracy to commit an offense containing a
circumstance element. To find a purpose to promote or facilitate the
commission of a crime where there is neither intent to act criminally
nor knowledge of the circumstances which make one's contemplated
conduct criminal stretches the concept of purposefulness to its outer
limits-and perhaps beyond.
IV. SCOPE OF CONSPIRACY: PURPOSE AND LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF
Co-CONsPIRATORS
In the above section the requirement of purpose to promote or
facilitate the commission of a crime was discussed. Once this pur-
pose is established, one must look to relationships between the co-
conspirators to determine the extent of conspiratorial liability.
A. A conspirator is liable for the acts of co-conspirators within the
common purpose of the conspiracy.
The problem in this section may be illustrated by the following
hypothetical: A and B have conspired to rob a bank. A knows that
B has hired a getaway driver but does not know his identity. C, the
driver, plans to steal a car to use in the robbery. Can A be held for
conspiracy to steal a car?
80. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 84 (2d ed. 1961); see also
Davidson v. United States, 61 F.2d 250, 253-54 (8th Cir. 1932).
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Under the Code's rationale, when a conspirator (A) knows of
the existence of a co-conspirator (C) and understands the purpose
of the conspiracy (robbing a bank), he may be held accountable for
the acts (stealing a car) of the co-conspirator (C) which ar6 within
the common purpose of the conspiracy (robbing a bank)."8 Current
law would hold A liable even though A does not know the identity
or the existence of C.82 Therefore, if the plans to steal a getaway car
are found to be within the common purpose of the conspiratorial
agreement, A may be held liable for the plans of C.
In United States v. Andolschek,O Judge Hand supported the
Code's formulation:
It is true that at times courts have spoken as though, if A. makes
a criminal agreement with B., he becomes a party to any conspir-
acy into which B. may enter, or may have entered, with third
persons. That is of course an error: the scope of the agreement
actually made always measures the conspiracy, and the fact that
B. engages in a conspiracy with others is as irrelevant as that he
engages in any other criime. It is true that a party to a conspiracy
need not know the identity, or even the number, of his confeder-
ates; when he embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite out-
line, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be
it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands
them. Nevertheless, he must be aware of those purposes, must
accept them and their implications, if he is to be charged with
what others may do in execution of them."
In United States v. Peoni,s5 Judge Hand also said:
At times it seemed to be supposed that, once some kind of criminal
concert is established, all parties are liable for everything anyone
of the original participants does, and even for what those do who
join later. Nothing could be more untrue. Nobody is liable in con-
spiracy except for the fair import of the concerted purpose or agree-
ment as he understands it; if later comers change that, he is not
liable for the change; his liability is limited to the common pur-
poses while he remains in it. The confusion is perhaps due to the
fact that everything done by the conspirators-including the dec-
81. See Comments, supra note 1, at 119, 123.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Cirillo, 468 F.2d 1233, 1239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 989 (1972); .United States v. Hester, 465 F.2d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1972).
83. 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
84. Id. at 507.
85. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
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larations of later entrants-is competent evidence against all, so
far as it may fairly be thought to be in execution of the concert to
which the accused is privy, though that doctrine too is often
abused."
However, Judge Hand's language in United States v.
Crimmins"' may leave the door open for an extension of a conspira-
tor's liability:
It is never permissible to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy itself
by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown to the rest,
have done what was beyond the reasonable intendment of the com-
mon understanding.8
Here, Judge Hand implies that the conspiracy may be enlarged
beyond its original boundaries if a conspirator has knowledge of a
co-conspirator's plans to so enlarge it. The exact extent of this liabil-
ity, enlarged by knowledge, is uncertain. However, the language in
Andolschek and Peoni indicates that the enlargement may not take
the form of including entirely new criminal activities which are in
no way related to the original conspiracy.
The rationale for Hand's view might be that A, having joined
the initial agreement, is under a duty to control the direction of the
conspiratorial activities or suffer the consequences for those ex-
panded activities of which he has knowledge. The rationale for the
basic rule that a conspirator is liable for the acts of co-conspirators
within the common purpose of the conspiracy appears to be rooted
in the generalized fear of group conduct. 9
B. The late-entering conspirator may be liable for the previous
plans of his co-conspirators.1°
Assume that A and B have conspired to commit larceny and sell
the fruits in a black market. Subsequently, but before the larceny
occurs, C conspires with A and B to receive stolen goods. At the time
C enters into the conspiracy, he learns the full dimension of the
plans of A and B to commit larceny. Can C be convicted of conspir-
86. Id. at 403.
87, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941).
88. Id. at 273.
89. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 924 (1959).
90. This section will not cover the situation where the previous conspiracy has been
completed prior to the appearance of a late entrant; rather it will deal only with the inchoate
offense, that is, where none of the conspirators' actions has reached the level of an attempt.
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acy to commit larceny, as well as conspiracy to receive stolen goods?
Under the Code's unilateral approach to individual responsibil-
ity, C can be held accountable only prospectively from the time he
enters the conspiracy." Therefore, C would almost certainly be held
accountable for the conspiracy to receive stolen goods. Moreover,
because the agreement to receive stolen goods may encourage or aid
the conspiracy to commit larceny, and because the Code defines
conspiracy as an agreement to promote or facilitate the commission
of a crime, C would probably be liable for conspiring to commit
larceny. 2 If, on the other hand, the larceny had been completed by
the time C entered the picture, C would be liable only for the con-
spiracy to receive stolen goods. 3
Judge Hand believed that, regardless of whether the late en-
trant's agreement encouraged the original conspirators, he should
be held accountable as long as he had full knowledge of the previous
conspiracy. In Kaplan v. United States,94 Hand wrote:
The notion is expressed in those cases which say that, in joining,
a new conspirator assumes whatever has been earlier done in pur-
suance of the plan .... While the new adherent must, of course,
be aware of the plan as a whole to become a party to the enterprise,
by his conscious adhesion he adopts what has been done before.
Hence it seems to us immaterial that the conspiracy be laid as of
a date earlier than that at which all in fact joined, or that the
original parties are convicted upon an overt act which takes place
before the new party came in . . .9
This statement is consistent with Judge Hand's views on the
liability of a conspirator for the acts of his co-conspirators within the
common purpose of the conspiracy." Because Judge Hand imposed
liability only for the fair import of the concerted purpose or agree-
ment as understood by the conspirator,9" if the acts of A and B are
within the common purpose of their conspiracy with C, C would be
held liable for conspiracy to commit larceny.
91. Comments, supra note 1, at 130. See note 14 supra. The MIssouRI PROPOSED CmM-
NAL CODE § 9.020 does not include a clause classifying aiding or soliciting of crimes as suffi-
cient purposes to constitute a conspiracy, as does § 5.03(1)(b) of the MODEL PENAL CODE.
However, since § 7.070(2) makes such conduct a separate offense, it falls under the more
general Missouri definition of conspiracy.
92. Comments, supra note 1, at 132.
93. Id.
94. 7 F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir. 1925).
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. See pt. IV § A of this article, supra.
97. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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Current law imposes liability if a late entrant merely has full
knowledge of the previous conspiracy, 8 rather than the more rigor-
ous requirements of the Code.
The social justifications for punishing conspiratorial conduct
are present if the late entrant actually encourages the members of
the existing conspiracy." However, the justification for punishing a
late-entering conspirator who does not encourage the other conspir-
ators in their earlier plans may be different. One rationale for pun-
ishing conspiratorial conduct is the belief that participation in a
group may make each individual conspirator bolder in his actions.
This rationale does not appear to apply to the situation where the
late entrant has no effect on previously made plans. Also, the late
entrant would not be held for helping precipitate the initial agree-
ment or for increasing the efficiency of the conspiracy. Therefore,
in terms of isolation or rehabilitation, the late entrant should be
judged on the basis of his own plans, as proposed by the Code, and
not on the acts and plans of others. In contrast, current law favors
punishing the late entrant in order to deter latecomers from joining
conspiracies. By making the latecomer liable for the previous plans
of co-conspirators as well as for his own prospective plans, he con-
ceivably might be deterred from joining the conspiracy. It is, how-
ever, extremely doubtful that the latecomer would have any knowl-
edge of this added liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The Code, Judge Hand, and some current law have sought to
limit the conspiracy offense by focusing on individual culpability.
In this view, that which is not criminal for an individual cannot
become a crime by virtue of a group agreement to commit it. Para-
doxically, this focus on individual culpability in another way broad-
ens liability as compared to conventional conspiracy law. For exam-
ple, conventional law and the decisions of Judge Hand require that
conviction be possible for at least two persons before liability can
be imposed on any one individual. Under the Code, however, if one
party is irresponsible or acquitted, the other party may nevertheless
be convicted for conspiracy. Thus, the Code's focus on individual
culpability imposes liability in some circumstances forbidden by
98. See, e.g., United States v. McGann, 431 F.2d 1104, 1106-07 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 919 (1970); Mendelson v. United States, 58 F.2d 532, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
99. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 924 (1959).
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A significantly beneficial aspect of the focus on individual culp-
ability is the requirement that each individual in the conspiratorial
agreement possess the purpose of promoting or facilitating the com-
mission of the substantive crime in question. Hand's substantial
effect on the drafters of the Code is apparent in the text and foot-
notes of the official comments. However, despite Hand's powerful
impact on the drafters, important differences remain between their
respective views on the mens rea requirement of conspiracy. First,
the Code, a reform document, goes further in requiring purposeful
conduct on the part of a defendant than did Judge Hand. Hand was
willing to find an inference of purpose in a broader set of circum-
stances than is the Code. ' Second, Hand endorsed implied terms
as manifestations of purpose sufficient to meet the mens rea require-
ment of conspiracy. Although the Code and the current law also
recognize the necessity in some circumstances to infer purpose
through implied terms, in mail fraud and interstate commerce
cases-prime areas for application of implied terms according to
Hand-the Code recommended that circumstance elements such as
use of the mails or the crossing of state boundaries be considered
only as a basis of federal jurisdiction rather than as an element of
the offense. The Supreme Court recently aligned the current law
with the Code's view. Third, where the object of the conspiracy is
the same as the conduct constituting the substantive crime in strict
liability cases, Hand would allow prosecution. He reasoned that the
purpose to commit the act existed even if the knowledge that the
act was criminal did not. The Code failed to take a firm stand on
strict liability crimes, but leaned in the same direction. Fourth,
under a ratification theory, Hand and the current law would allow
a late entrant to be held accountable for previously conceived plans
if they fell within the common purpose of his agreement and the
previous plans and their implications were known to him. The Code
indicated that if the late entrant's conspiracy did not promote or
facilitate the previous conspiracy, he would not possess the requisite
purposefulness for conviction on the previous conspiracy. Hand and
the current law focus on the individual in this situation but require
less than the Code for imposition of liability.
The tendency under past and present law has been to use the
100. Perhaps Hand as a judge felt limited in his power to dismantle common law
conspiracy as developed by generations of jurisprudence.
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fear of group conduct to weaken mens rea requirements and proce-
dural safeguards for those accused of conspiracy. The emphasis on
individual culpability, which Judge Hand and the Code espouse,
would prevent this weakening effect from occurring.
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